This week’s issue includes a profile of Lt. Gen. Kamel el-Wazir and reports on the militarization of education, a new case of suspected police extrajudicial killings, and prison deaths.
The General Who Could Not Impose Order on Egypt’s Transport System
Lieutenant General Kamel el-Wazir entered the Transport Ministry as the embodiment of Sisi’s governing proposition: where civilian administration had failed, military command would deliver. Sisi appointed his close ally in March 2019, days after a locomotive crashed and exploded at Cairo’s Ramses Station, killing more than 20 people. Wazir had headed the Armed Forces Engineering Authority, which oversaw many of Sisi’s white elephant construction projects, earning Sisi’s praise as “one of the best army officers.” The general was presented as the disciplinarian who would make Egypt’s roads and railways safe.
Instead, Wazir extended the barracks into the ministry. Applicants for transport jobs were screened through the Military Academy, while the Military Technological College assumed responsibility for training railway technicians. Civilian recruitment became entangled with military drilling and ideological instruction. By 2026, even technicians recruited by Egyptian National Railways and the River Transport Sector were graduating from military-run courses with Wazir in attendance.
Military control also reached transport institutions managing the money, but the figures dispute Sisi’s worldview about military efficiency.
The National Authority for Tunnels, whose leadership has long been dominated by retired army engineers, was allocated LE257.727 billion of the LE459.253 billion in loans and credit facilities budgeted for Egypt’s economic authorities in FY2026/27. Its chairman, Major General Tarek Gweily, succeeded another retired general who became an assistant transport minister.
An independent analysis estimated about $18 billion in transport-sector financing agreements from 2014 to 2025, excluding interest. While some agreements were made before Wazir’s tenure, many supported the megaprojects he advocated. By mid-2026, the National Authority for Tunnels’ debt reportedly surpassed LE2 trillion. The authority recorded losses exceeding LE44 billion in FY2024/25 and faced annual costs of about LE74 billion, with revenues of only around LE8.8 billion. Of these expenses, nearly LE63 billion was interest.
The government’s own figures show that Wazir has also failed to make transportation safer. According to CAPMAS figures, motorcycle-related road deaths rose from 190 in 2020 to 897 in 2024, an increase of roughly 372%. The toll peaked at 1,015 deaths in 2022, then declined to 970 in 2023 and 897 in 2024. Even after that decline, motorcycle deaths remained more than four times higher than their 2021 level. CAPMAS also reported 5,260 road fatalities in 2024, a 10.3% decrease from 2023, but injuries increased by 7.5% to 76,362. Railway accidents rose by 21.5% to 220.
Wazir’s responses demonstrate a lack of accountability, often blaming the victims or junior staff. After the Dabaa derailment, he dismissed infrastructure issues, citing “loose bolts” or speed, and noted that train accidents occur elsewhere. At al-Arish Port, demolitions continued despite promises to halt and provide compensation.
Egypt got new roads, bridges, trains, and stations under Wazir, but also got higher fares, displacement, disasters, and debt.
Counterrevolution in Egypt
Interviewed by the Counter-Punch Podcast about my book.
How Military Academy Requirements Discriminate Against Teachers
The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights commissioned me to translate into English a report on the saga of the school teachers vetted and disqualified by the Military Academy, part of Sisi’s broader drive to militarize the state and society.
